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THE GULF CRISIS AND COLLECTIVE
SECURITY UNDER THE UNITED
NATIONS CHARTER
INTRODUCTION
The international response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
stirred hope in many people around the world that, for the first
time since it was created forty-five years ago, the United Na-
tions can fulfill its role as the keeper of international peace and
security.1 For the first time since 1950, during the Korean Con-
flict, the Security Council adopted resolutions2 condemning an
act of aggression, calling for universal action to stop the aggres-
sion, and imposing sanctions to force the aggressor out of the
invaded territory.3 The most remarkable aspect of the adoption
of these resolutions is not that the Soviet Union did not boycott
the Council, as it did in the Korean Conflict,4 but that no per-
manent member of the Security Council5 used its veto power' to
Greenberger & Shribman, Coming of Age: U.N., Long Stymied By Cold War, Be-
gins to Fulfill Its Promise, Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
2 For a full discussion of the resolutions adopted in the Gulf Crisis, see infra notes
55-160 and accompanying text. For a full discussion of the resolutions adopted in the
Korean Conflict, see infra notes 161-73 and accompanying text.
3 Lewis, Security Council Votes 13 to 0 to Block Trade with Baghdad; Facing Boy-
cott, Iraq Slows Oil, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
Woolsey, The "Uniting for Peace" Resolution of the United Nations, 45 AM. J.
INT'L L. 129 (1951).
" The five permanent Members of the Security Council are the Republic of China,
France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. U.N. CHARTER art. 23, para. 1.
' The veto power is derived from the permanent members' each having to vote con-
currently with any resolution not involving procedural matters of the Security Council.
U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3. The article provides, in its entirety:
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by
an affirmative vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent
members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of
Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.
U.N. CHARTER art. 27.
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prevent the Council from acting.
In view of the cooperation between the United States and
the Soviet Union in the post-cold war era,7 the Security Council
has a better chance of fulfilling its role as the body of the United
Nations charged with the primary responsibility of maintaining
international peace and security." However, it may be imprudent
to assume that now all international disputes can be solved
without strengthening the United Nations' hand in resolving
these conflicts.'
The United Nations was created in view of the League of
Nations' inability to prevent war. 10 The United Nations Charter
was framed based on the idea of collective security.1 The na-
tions of the world gathered at the General Assembly's first meet-
ing with the expectation that by giving up some of their sover-
Reisman, International Law After the Cold War, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 859, 861
(1990). The definition of cold war is:
la]n international term for state of tension between the capitalistic Powers and
the USSR. Introduced by the American Senator B. Baruch in a speech made in
Colombia [sic] S. Carolina on Apr. 16, 1947, popularized that year in a book by
the American publicist W. Lipmann entitled Cold War. According to the opinion
of J.K. Gailbraith the cold war in 1946-66 was in close relation to the development
of industry, which expressed itself in the arms race, while the next impulses were
found in the space race. A new wave of a cold war after a period of detente started
in the 1980s.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 158 (Taylor &
Francis ed. 1985) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA].
I U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1. This provides: "1. In order to ensure prompt and
effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council pri-
mary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree
that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their
behalf." Id.
9 Keyes, The U.N., A Wobbly House of Cards, Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1990, at A8, col.
4. "It would be a mistake to believe that the U.N.'s ability to deal with the Gulf situation
means that the organization itself can suddenly overcome its inherent structural and
political deficiencies." Id. at col. 6.
" Lewis, The Big Voice: A Debate About the Powers At the U.N., N.Y. Times, Aug.
12, 1990, § 4, at 3. The article explains:
Remembering the failure of the League of Nations and the horrors of the war
that followed, the five major victors saw a powerful Security Council as the key-
stone, alongside the deliberative General Assembly, in a system of collective se-
curity that would make another such conflict impossible.
Id. (emphasis added).
" The term collective security is defined as: "lain international term from the in-
terwar period, originating from the preamble of the Covenant of the League of Nations,
which obligated all nations to solidarity 'for their peace and security'." ENCYCLOPEDIA,
supra note 6, at 158.
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eign rights their security and international peace would be
maintained.12
Collective security is the commitment by nations to resolve
disputes, regardless of nationalistic concerns. When diplomacy
has failed, nations committed to collective security can lend
their armed forces to help settle a dispute. In the most prolific
example of a collective security arrangement, nations send their
forces to defend or liberate an invaded nation, in situations
where they normally would have acted in their own national in-
terest by either: (1) remaining neutral and not sending forces or
" Address of Chairman of First General Assembly (January 10, 1946) in FROM COL-
LECTIVE SECURITY TO PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY 217 (Larus ed. 1965) [hereinafter COLLEC-
TIVE SECURITY]. This provides, in pertinent part:
Determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war which,
twice in our lifetime, has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and imbued with an
abiding faith in freedom and justice, we have come to this British capital, which
bears upon it the deep impress of a heroic majesty, to constitute the General As-
sembly of the United Nations and to make a genuine and sincere beginning with
the application of the San Francisco Charter. That instrument, having been freely
and democratically debated, has been unreservedly accepted by all in the knowl-
edge that the machinery set up under its provisions will prove adequate to the
achievement of its historic purpose; this, in a word, is the maintenance of peace
and security by collective recourse, when needed, to the use of land, sea and air
forces and the establishment, through cooperation in the economic, social, educa-
tional and humanitarian fields, of those conditions of stability and well-being
which will ensure peaceful and friendly relations, based on the principle of equal
rights and self-determination among the nations of the world.
In the achievement of this task, all of us, great and small, strong and weak,
will give our unqualified and unhesitating support.
The five great Powers which, by virtue of Articles 24 and 27 of the Charter,
and by the very nature of things, will shoulder the chief responsibility for the
maintenance of peace and security, will bring not only the immense power of their
military, financial and industrial resources, but something more important, with-
out which their very power would be nothing but the prelude to an unthinkable
cataclysm; I mean good will, divested of every shred of intrigue or trickery, and
that spirit of co-operation which is vital in order to maintain among them of good
understanding upon which our whole Organization rests.
In signing the Charter, the other Powers have already deposited as their first
contribution to this great undertaking, a large part of that which they hold most
dear and most precious, a large part, that is, of their sovereignty. They made this
sacrifice with deep emotion, but without hesitation, in the belief that here was the
beginning of a new era in which their security would be collectively guaranteed by
adequate and effective means, and any aggression or attempt at aggression di-
rected against them would be severely repressed.
Id. at 217-18 (emphases added).
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(2) sending forces to aid the aggressor. 13
One can conclude that the United Nations can fulfill its
stated purpose of maintaining international peace and security,"
by measuring its ability to establish collective security. In order
to determine whether collective security was attained in the Per-
sian Gulf Crisis, the actions taken by the Security Council and
by the several military powers who responded to Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait must be analyzed.
This comment will analyze whether collective security was
attained in the Gulf Crisis. Section I will address the Iraqi inva-
sion of Kuwait as a violation of international law. Section II will
examine the actions taken by the Security Council and the inter-
national community in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
while Section III will compare the actions taken in the Gulf Cri-
" Kenneth Thompson explained fundamental precepts of collective security as
follows:
The rock bottom principle upon which collective security is founded provides that
an attack on any one state will be regarded as an attack on all states. It finds its
measure in the simple doctrine of one for all and all for one. War anywhere, in the
context of Article 11 of the League of Nations, is the concern of every state.
Thompson, Collective Security Reexamined, in COLLECTIVE SECURITY, supra note 11, at
285, 287. Another commentator has explained collective security as follows:
It stands to reason that provisions and commitments for police action would add
nothing to the protection that victims of aggression have enjoyed under the old
system unless such victims could expect more military assistance than they would
have received otherwise.
In order that collective security add in this way to the strength of the defense
and to the chances of deterrence, it must be assumed that some nations, including
one or more of the great powers, will be prepared to resort to force-that is, for all
practical purposes, go to war-when, if they had not been devoted to the principle
of collective security, they would have remained neutral or fought on the side of
the aggressor.
Wolfers, Collective Security and the War in Korea, in COLLECTIVE SECURITY, supra note
11, at 225, 226.
" The purposes of the United Nations are stated in Article 1 of its Charter. This
provides, in pertinent part:
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take ef-
fective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice
and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situa-
tions which might lead to a breach of the peace . . ..
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
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sis with those taken in the Korean Conflict. Section IV will then
examine the proposals that were made at the end of the Korean
Conflict to create a multinational armed force under the United
Nations' control. This comment will conclude that such a
peacekeeping force may be the only mechanism by which the
United Nations can attain collective security but that political
differences will prevent its formation.
I. IRAQ'S VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops drove across the border sep-
arating Iraq and Kuwait and attacked Kuwait City.1" Iraqi Pres-
ident Saddam Hussein claimed that the invasion was requested
by revolutionaries in order to take over the Kuwaiti Govern-
ment.16 However, by taking this action Iraq arguably interfered
with the recognized sovereignty and independence of Kuwait,
thereby violating international law.
In 1961, Kuwait was declared independent of British rule by
a treaty between Kuwait and the United Kingdom." Two years
later Kuwait applied to become a Member of the United Na-
tions,' 8 and was admitted to membership by passage of a Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution. 9 After several months, Iraq recog-
nized the sovereignty and independence of Kuwait according to
the borders set forth in correspondence between Iraq's Prime
Minister and the ruler of Kuwait in 1932.20
By its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq violated provisions of the
United Nations Charter and can be characterized as an aggres-
sor according to the United Nations General Assembly Resolu-
, Gordon, Iraq Army Invades Capital of Kuwait in Fierce Fighting, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 2, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
le Id.
17 Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Between the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Kuwait Regarding Relations Between the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the State of Kuwait, June
19, 1961, United Kingdom-Kuwait, 5743 U.N.T.S. 240.
"8 Kuwait: Declaration of Acceptance of the Obligations Contained in the Charter of
the United Nations, April 20, 1963, Kuwait, 6705 U.N.T.S. 214.
19 Id. at n. 1.
0 Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding
the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters, Oct. 4, 1963,
Iraq-Kuwait, 7063 U.N.T.S. 326.
1991]
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tion on the Definition of Aggression.21
A. Iraq's Violation of the United Nations Charter
The United Nations Charter requires Members to settle
their disputes by peaceful means22 and to refrain from the threat
or use of force against the territorial or political independence of
any State.23 Article 33 requires parties to a dispute to resort to
certain enumerated and other peaceful means to seek a solution,
such as negotiation, enquiry and mediation.24
In this case, Iraq did seek peaceful means to resolve its dis-
pute with Kuwait before the invasion.25 The dispute itself arose
out of the oil emirates' increase in their output and sales of oil.26
This caused a decrease in the price of oil on the world market
and a corresponding loss of revenues for Iraq.27 As a result, Iraq
sought to coerce Kuwait and other Arab oil producers to reduce
their output of oil so that the overall supply of oil in the world
market would be reduced.2" The hope was that this would cause
an increase in the price of oil on the world market and a corre-
sponding gain of revenues for Iraq.29
The leading overproducers of the Oil and Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OPEC) were Kuwait and the United Arab
s G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 143, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
12 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1. This provides: "1. All Members shall settle their
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security, and justice, are not endangered." Id.
23 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. "4. All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations." Id. (emphases added).
U.N. CHiRTER art. 33, para. 1.
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solu-
tion by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settle-
ment, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their
own choice.
Id.
2 J. MILLER & L. MYLORIE, SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE CRISIS IN THE GULF 15 (1990).
26 Brooks, Hussein Threatens Use of Force to Hold Oil-Output Quotas, Wall St. J.,
July 18, 1990, at A6, col. 3.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
[Vol. 3:267
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Emirates.30 President Hussein charged those two countries with
waging "economic warfare" against Iraq and other oil producing
countries."1 Iraq had been forced to borrow from rich Arab oil
emirates such as Kuwait to fight the eight year war against
Iran."2 At the end of this war, Iraq sought forgiveness of its debt
from Kuwait and the other emirates,3 3 arguing that these emir-
ates benefitted from Iraq's halt of expansionism under Iran's
Ayatollah Komeini. 34 Instead of granting such forgiveness, Ku-
wait hoarded the oil that lay beneath the soil in the neutral zone
between Iraq and Kuwait, making it more difficult for Iraq to
recover economically from the ruins of its war with Iran.3 5 Iraq
used these events to gain political support for the invasion from
Arabs less fortunate than the rich oil producing Arab states," as
a way "to bring back things to their right place." '
Although the Iraqi arguments bear some merit, Iraq failed
to exhaust peaceful means to bring about a settlement of these
disputes with Kuwait." Iraq did not submit them for judicial
determination by any adjudicatory or factfinding body, and did
not seek a mutually agreeable forum to resolve these disputes
peacefully with Kuwait. Therefore, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait vi-
olated the United Nations Charter.
B. Iraq's Invasion and the Definition of Aggression Resolution
The Definition of Aggression Resolution 39 describes aggres-
sion as one State's use of armed force against the "sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another State
30 Tanner, Iraq's Boldness Raises New Questions on OPEC Midyear Session, Lead-
ership, Wall St. J., July 20, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
31 Id.
32 Piracy in the Gulf, Wall St. J., July 26, 1990, at A16, col. 1.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
31 Ibrahim, Saudis Make a Stand, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1990, at Al, col. 3, A10, col.
3. This states: "'There are many elements in the Arab world which want to see the
demise of all Arab regimes in the gulf,' [a Saudi official said.] 'We have to look elsewhere
for support.'" Id. at A10.
37 See Brooks, supra note 26.
38 See Iraqi Invasion, Step by Step, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1990, at A9, col. 1.
39 G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 143, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
1991]
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.... ,,,0 Invasion, military occupation and annexation qualify as
acts of aggression,' 1 and the first use of armed force is "prima
facie evidence of an act of aggression."' 2
According to this definition, Iraq's invasion of the territory
of Kuwait, as the first use of armed force in the dispute between
those two States, is prima facie evidence of an act of aggression.
To refute this evidence, Iraq asserted s that Kuwait has
been a province under Iraq's control since Iraq was granted
power over part of the Ottoman Empire."" Iraq claimed that the
4" Id. at art. 1. This provides: "Aggression is the use of armed force by a State
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in
this Definition." Id. (emphases added).
1 Id. at art. 3. Article 3 specifically provides:
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and
in accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of an-
other State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such
invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of an-
other State or part thereof ....
Id. (emphases added).
'2 Id. at art. 2.
"' A statement from the ruling Revolutionary Command Council of Iraq which can
be used to refute the prima facie evidence of aggression was given as follows:
One of the most egregious criminal acts of colonialism was its partition of the
homeland, which was a single homeland the day Baghdad was the capital of all
Arabs.
In all cases, while drawing up geographic and sovereignty boundaries for all
states, Western colonialism sought to make all states weak and to insure that par-
tition, with the passage of time, would prevent these states from closing ranks and
demonstrating a unified stance.
What has befallen other states in the Arab lands befell Iraq when colonialism
divested it of a dear part of it, namely Kuwait, and kept Iraq away from the wa-
ters to prevent it from acquiring part of its tactical and strategic abilities, and
thus kept part of its people and part of its wealth away from the origin and the
well spring.
Excerpts From Iraq's Statement on Kuwait, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1990, at A18, col. 1.
" Seib, Iraq Has Shaky Claim to Kuwait, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1990, at A5, col. 2.
This states, in pertinent part:
Iraq had asserted its right to control Kuwait even before the Kuwaiti state
won its independence from Britain in 1961.
Above all, that claim is based on the fact that, before the British dominated
the region, the Ottoman Empire had declared that Kuwait was part of a province
controlled from the Iraqi city of Basra. Iraq argues that the lines of control estab-
lished in that Ottoman era should still apply, not borders later worked out by the
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol3/iss1/9
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British arbitrarily carved up the region and as a result the terri-
tory of Kuwait was no longer within Iraq's borders.'
Iraq argued that when Kuwait was granted independence in
1961 and Iraq declared its claim over the territory,' 6 the British
protected Kuwait, threatening to use force against Iraq if it did
not recognize Kuwait's sovereignty. If such a threat actually co-
erced Iraq to agree to recognize Kuwait as a sovereign nation,
Britain would have violated Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Char-
ter,47 and thus the legitimacy of Kuwait's sovereignty would be
in doubt.
With Kuwait's sovereignty in doubt, Iraq would be able to
rely on Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, which declares that
the United Nations does not have authority to "intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state ... "48 Iraq could then argue that the United Na-
tions may not interfere in Iraq's affairs concerning the territory
of Kuwait, because Kuwait is part of Iraq. Iraq could further
argue that the United States-led coalition forces violated inter-
national law, because they used the threat of force, in violation
of article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter, to dictate the resolution
of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute.
Another argument in the Iraqi arsenal is that the invasion
was justified by Kuwait's exploitation"9 of the oil fields in the
territory declared neutral between Iraq and Kuwait.50 Such ex-
British.
Id.
" See generally J.B. KELLY, ARABIA, THE GULF & THE WEST 164-289 (1980).
" Brooks, supra note 26. This states, in pertinent part: "Iraq's claim to sovereignty
over Kuwait. . . predates the desert emirate's independence from Britain in 1961. Then,
Iraq was bought off only after Kuwait paid $84 million, and even so, territorial disputes
flared in 1973 and 1976." Id.
4 For the full text of this paragraph, see supra note 23.
48 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. This provides, in its entirety:
7. Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
Id.
49 Gordon, supra note 14.
80 Kifner, Arab's Summit Meeting Off; Iraqi Units in Kuwait Dig in; Europe Bars
Baghdad's Oil, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1990, at A14, col. 4.
1991]
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ploitation arguably threatened the economic survival of the Iraqi
people. 51 Because of this exploitation of oil, Kuwait arguably vi-
olated international law.
These arguments may seem convincing, however, Article 5
of the Definition of Aggression declares: "[n]o consideration of
whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or other-
wise, may serve as a justification for aggression." ' 2 Moreover, the
Arab League, of which Iraq and Kuwait are members, declared,
in its pact signed March 12, 1944, that "[tihe main aim is to co-
ordinate the political programmes of Members 'in such a way as
to effect real collaboration between them, to preserve their inde-
pendence and sovereignty. . . .' [Furthermore,] under Article V
[of the pact] the League Members renounce recourse to force to
resolve disputes between them. '53
Iraq failed to exhaust diplomatic efforts and resorted to the
use of armed force to resolve its dispute with Kuwait. Moreover,
it attacked without provocation and not in self-defense. Pursu-
ant to the aforementioned treaties and resolutions it appears
that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was a violation of international
law.54
5' See generally J. PAUST & A. BLAUSTEIN, THE ARAB OIL WEAPON (1977).
52 Aggression Resolution, supra note 21.
" BowETT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 192-94 (1953).
"4 Reference herein has been made to treaties and other international agreements.
Treaties have been referred to as "the prime source of international law." Lee, Multilat-
eral Treaty Making and Negotiation Techniques: An Appraisal, in CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER 157
(1988) (Dr. Lee is the Principal Legal Officer, Office of the Legal Counsel, Counsel of
Legal Affairs, United Nations).
Widely accepted sources of international law are as follows:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law.
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38, para. 1. All members of the
United Nations are ipso facto parties to this Statute. U.N. CHARTER art. 93.
[Vol. 3:267
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II. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND DEPLOYMENT OF
ARMED FORCES IN THE GULF REGION
In response to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, the United
Nations Security Council condemned a Member state as an ag-
gressor for only the fifth time in its forty-five-year history.55 For
the second time in its history, the Security Council authorized
the deployment of armed forces to stop an aggressor nation. The
first time was in response to the Communist invasion of South
Korea in 1950.
The Charter of the United Nations authorizes the Security
Council to investigate disputes,5 make recommendations upon
its own initiative57 or that of the parties to a dispute,68 deter-
mine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace or act of aggression," call upon parties to comply with
1$ Lewis, U.N. Condemns the Invasion with Threat to Punish Iraq, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 3, 1990, at A10, col. 1.
56 U.N. CHARTER art. 34. The language of Article 34 reads as follows: "The Security
Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international
friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the
dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security." Id.
', Id. at art. 36. This article reads:
1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred
to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures
or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the
settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should
also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred
by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Statute of the Court.
Id.
S Id. at art. 37. Article 37 reads:
1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail
to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Secur-
ity Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall
decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of
settlement as it may consider appropriate.
Id.
59 Id. at art. 39: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations,
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to main-
tain or restore international peace and security." Id.
11
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provisional measures,60 take measures not involving or involving
the use of armed force, 61 and call upon other Members to assist
it by complying with such measures and by providing armed
forces and other resources.62
The biggest stumbling block to the Security Council's effec-
tiveness to date has been the power of the permanent members
to veto actions which otherwise would have been taken. A close
reading of Article 2763 reveals that on procedural matters, all
00 Id. at art. 40:
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may,
before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for
in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional
measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be
without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The
Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional
measures.
Id.
01 Id. at arts. 41 and 42.
ARTICLE 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon
the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal,
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplo-
matic relations.
ARTICLE 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
Id.
02 Id. at art. 43.
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the mainte-
nance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Se-
curity Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agree-
ments, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage,
necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of
forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facili-
ties and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the
initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security
Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members
and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes.
Id.
OS Id. at art. 27. For the full text of Article 27, see supra note 5.
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that is needed to pass a resolution is an affirmative vote of nine
members, while on matters that are not procedural the concur-
rence of the permanent members is required." This means that
if any one permanent member votes against a measure, that
measure will not pass. Further, the General Assembly may not
act with regard to a matter of international peace and security
while the Security Council is exercising its functions with regard
to the same matter.6 Therefore, a single permanent member of
the Security Council may prevent the entire United Nations
from fulfilling its purpose.6 Nevertheless, this apparently insur-
mountable hurdle was overcome during the Gulf Crisis.
A. Security Council Resolutions and the International
Response
In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Security Coun-
cil 7 "acted with greater promptitude and cohesion than at any
time since the Korean Conflict."6 8 The Council passed its first
resolution 9 on the heels of the invasion. Pursuant to Article 39
64 Id.
I' ld. at art. 12. This provides:
•1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situa-
tion the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly
shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation un-
less the Security Council so requests.
2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall no-
tify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the mainte-
nance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Secur-
ity Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of
the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately [when]
the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.
Id.
6 F. WILCOX & C. MARCY, PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN THE UNITED NATIONs 299-343
(1980) [hereinafter PROPOSALS]. The authors of PROPOSALS argue for reform of the veto
power. This comment does not focus on this problem, because it evaluates the chances
for collective security in the post-cold war environment in which the veto may not be
exercised even though all permanent members are present at the Security Council.
67 In addition to the five permanent members-China, France, the U.S.S.R., the
U.K. and the U.S.-there are ten rotating seats, currently held by Canada, Finland, Co-
lombia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Ivory Coast, Zaire, Romania, Cuba and Yemen. Yemen, the
only Arab state represented on the Council, was the only member of the council that did
not vote in favor of the resolution, abstaining due to its not having received instructions
from its Government on how to vote. Lewis, supra note 55.
68 Keyes, supra note 8.
6 S.C. Res. 660, 45 U.N. SCOR (2951st mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990) [herein-
13
PACE YB. INT'L L. [Vol. 3:267
of the Charter,'7 the Council determined that the invasion con-
stituted a breach of international peace and security. 7' Then, ex-
plicitly referring to Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter, 2 the
Council condemned the invasion, demanded Iraq's immediate
and unconditional withdrawal, and called upon Iraq and Kuwait
to begin intensive negotiations to resolve their disputes. 73
While the Security Council was acting, the United States
deployed a naval task force from the Indian Ocean to the Per-
sian Gulf,74 in response to a call from the Kuwaiti Ambassador
in Washington for immediate American military intervention.
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union halted its flow of arms to Iraq and
stated that "[t]he sovereignty, national independence and terri-
torial integrity of the State of Kuwait must be fully restored and
protected."" West European countries unanimously condemned
the invasion and Britain and France joined the United States in
freezing Kuwaiti assets to prevent Iraq from gaining control over
them.77 Syria called for an emergency Arab summit conference
to discuss the "blatant invasion of sisterly Kuwait by Saddam
after Resolution 660].
10 U.N. CHARTER art. 39. For the full text of Article 39, see supra note 59.
" "Determining that there exists a breach of international peace and security as
regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait." Resolution 660, supra note 69.
"' For the full text of Article 40, see supra note 60.
"' Resolution 660 provides:
Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait;
2. Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its
forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990;
3. Calls upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations
for the resolution of their differences and supports all efforts in this regard, and
especially those of the League of Arab States;
4. Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure com-
pliance with the present resolution.
Id. supra note 69.
" Apple, Naked Aggression: Bush Suggests Action By U.N.-Emir Flees to Saudi
Arabia Exile, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1990, at A8, col. 1.
75 Id.
"' See Bohlen, Arms Flow to Iraq Halted by Soviets, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1990, at
A10, col. 1.
" Riding, West Europeans Join U.S. in Condemning Invasion, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3,
1990, at A10, col. 2. Further, on August 5, 1990, Belgium, Canada, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Norway, and West Germany took measures to prevent Iraqi seizure of
Kuwaiti assets. More Europeans Act, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1990, at A6, col. 6.
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Hussein's forces. 7 8
After two days of debate, the Arab League decided to con-
demn the invasion 9 and to call on Iraq to withdraw.80 American
Secretary of State James A. Baker III and Soviet Foreign Minis-
ter Eduard A. Shevardnadze met in Moscow. They condemned
the invasion and jointly called on the United Nations Security
Council to "promptly and decisively condemn the brutal and il-
legal invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi military forces."'" Baker and
Shevardnadze further called on "regional organizations, espe-
cially the League of Arab States, all Arab governments as well as
the Nonaligned Movement and the Islamic Conference to take
all possible steps to insure that the U.N. Security Council reso-
lution is carried out." 2
The second Security Council Resolution8" came on August
6, 1990. Through this resolution, the United States proposed
that the United Nations "ban all imports from Iraq and Kuwait,
and all exports to the countries, except for medicine and sup-
plies of a humanitarian nature."' The resolution "won the sup-
port of 13 of the Council's 15 members, with only Yemen and
Cuba abstaining."8 5
Resolution 661 specifically referred to the Security Council's
responsibilities under Articles 1 and 24 of the Charter. 6 Article
1 states the purposes of the United Nations, including the re-
sponsibility for maintaining international peace and security.8 7
Article 24 charges the Security Council with the primary respon-
7 See Y. Ibrahim, A New Gulf Alignment, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1990, at Al, col. 4.
79 Kifner, Arabs to Convene on Iraqi Invasion, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1990, at Al, col.
1.
8o Id.
" See Keller, Moscow Joins U.S. in Criticizing Iraq, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1990, at
A6, col. 1.
82 See id. at col. 3.
83 S.C. Res. 661, 45 U.N. SCOR (2951st mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990) [herein-
after Resolution 661].
0' See Lewis, Washington Calls on U.N. to Impose Boycott on Iraq, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 4, 1990, at A6, col. 5.
85 Lewis, Security Council Votes 13 to 0 to Block Trade With Baghdad; Facing
Boycott, Iraq Slows Oil; Pullout Demanded, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
8 Resolution 661 provides: "Mindful of its responsibilities under the Charter of the
United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security." Resolution
661, supra note 83.
"' For the full text of Article 1, paragraph 1, see supra note 13.
1991]
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sibility for acting pursuant to this purpose.8
Resolution 661 also specified the Council's determination to
restore Kuwait's sovereignty 9 in order to promote the United
Nations' aim of having its Members act in accordance with the
principle of sovereign equality of all United Nations Members,90
including that of Iraq and Kuwait. The Resolution also explic-
itly referred to the right of Kuwait, and of other Arab states
threatened by Iraq's act of aggression, to individual or collective
self-defense, 91 pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter. 2
The Council then took measures pursuant to Article 4191 of
the Charter. This provision had been invoked only two other
times since the United Nations was founded forty-five years
ago.9 The Council declared that States were to take measures
not involving the use of armed force to coerce Iraq into compli-
ance with the Council's call for Iraq's immediate and uncondi-
tional withdrawal from Kuwait.95 The Council declared that
States shall prevent the import of any commodities coming from
Iraq or Kuwait, the sale or supply of commodities to Iraq or Ku-
11 For the full text of Article 24, paragraph 1, see supra note 7.
89 Resolution 661, supra note 83. The Resolution's preamble provides: "Determined
to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait .... " Id.
90 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 2. This provides: "The Organization and its Members,
in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following
Principles. . . . 1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of
all its Members." Id.
91 Resolution 661, supra note 83. This provides, in pertinent part: "Affirming the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, in response to the armed attack by
Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter .. Id.
92 U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to main-
tain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise
of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Id.
93 For the full text of U.N. CHARTER art. 41, see supra note 61.
9' The first two were in Rhodesia and South Africa. Lewis, supra note 85, at col. 6.
95 Resolution 661, supra note 83: "Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations. . . 1. Determines that Iraq so far has failed to comply with paragraph 2
of resolution 660 (1990) and has usurped the authority of the legitimate government of
Kuwait." Id. at para. 1.
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol3/iss1/9
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wait,9 6 and the providing of any funds or financial and economic
resources to Iraq or Kuwait.9 7 The Council also established a
committee to look into the implementation of the resolution.9
In addition to addressing measures which would hamper
support of Iraq, the Council also addressed measures to protect
Kuwait. The Council called upon all States to protect the assets
of the Kuwaiti Government and not to recognize the occupying
" Id. at para. 3.
3. Decides that all States shall prevent:
(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originat-
ing in Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution;
(b) Any activities by their nations or in their territories which would promote
or are calculated to promote the export or trans-shipment of any commodities or
products from Iraq or Kuwait; and any dealings by their nationals or their flag
vessels or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in Iraq or
Kuwait and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution, including
in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purposes of such
activities or dealings;
(c) The sale or supply by their nations or from their territories or using their
flag vessels of any commodities or products, including weapons or any other mili-
tary equipment, whether or not originating in their territories but not including
supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circum-
stances, foodstuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or
body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Iraq or Ku-
wait, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or
are calculated to promote such sale or supply of such commodities or products.
Id.
I 7 Id. at para. 4. This provides:
4. Decides that all States shall not make available to the Government of Iraq
or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait,
any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their
nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from their terri-
tories or otherwise making available to that Government or to any such undertak-
ing any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or
bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, except payments exclusively for strictly medical or
humanitarian purposes and in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs.
Id.
98 Id. at para. 6.
6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of
procedure of the Security Council, a Committee of the Security Council consisting
of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report
on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:
(a) To examine the reports on the progress of the implementation of the pre-
sent resolution which will be submitted by the Secretary-General;
(b) To seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by
them concerning the effective implementation of the provisions laid down in the
present resolution.
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power Iraq established in Kuwait.99
On the day after the resolution was passed, American Presi-
dent George Bush entered into an agreement with Saudi Arabia
providing for the stationing of American troops on Saudi terri-
tory and for the expansion of oil production to ease the shortage
resulting from the embargo.100 Egypt agreed to join the multina-
tional force so that the operation would have an international
Arab presence. 0 " Turkey agreed, and Saudi Arabia was expected
to agree, to cut off the flow of oil from the pipelines that deliver
oil from Iraq to ports in the Mediterranean and Red Seas.102
On August 8, 1990, President Saddam Hussein announced
Iraq's annexation of Kuwait.10 3 In response, President Hosni
Mubarak of Egypt alleged that Hussein lied to him about his
intentions before the invasion. Mubarak said Hussein now put
him in an embarassing situation in which it would be difficult to
keep outside influences, namely the United States-led forces and
the United Nations, from getting involved in the crisis. 04
Mubarak then called for an "Arab umbrella," an emergency
Arab summit meeting to avert outside intervention.0 "
At the same time, the Security Council 0 6 adopted its third
resolution.107 The Council declared that Iraq's annexation of Ku-
" Id. at para. 9. This provides:
9. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 through 8 above, nothing in
the present resolution shall prohibit assistance to the legitimate Government of
Kuwait, and calls upon all States:
(a) To take appropriate measures to protect assets of the legitimate Govern-
ment of Kuwait and its agencies;
(b) Not to recognize any rbgime set up by the occupying power.
Id.
200 Ibrahim, supra note 36.
101 Rosenthal, Bush Sends U.S. force to Saudi Arabia as Kingdom Agrees to Con-
front Iraq; Seeks Joint Action, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
102 Id.
103 Kifner, Merger Declared; Mubarak's Summit Call Gets Quiet Response From
Arab Leaders, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1990, at Al, col. 1 [hereinafter Kifner].
104 Id. at A18.
105 Id.
'" This time Yemen, the only Arab member of the Council, voted for the resolution.
Apple, Confrontation in the Gulf: U.S. Set to Blockade Baghdad's Shipping; Iraq De-
tains Foreigners, Upsets Summit; 50 Ships Assemble, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1990, at Al,
col. 6.
"' S.C. Res. 662, 45 U.N. SCOR (2951st mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 (1990).
[Vol. 3:267
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wait was null and void.108 The Council went further and called
on others not to recognize the annexation, 09 and demanded that
Iraq rescind its annexation." 0
During this period, more American forces, as well as forces
from other nations, were being deployed to the Gulf region."'
The United States declared that it might send as many as
100,000 troops to the Gulf,"' and there were signs that the atti-
tude of Arab rulers was turning against the Iraqi President."13 In
addition, there was talk at the United Nations of revitalizing the
Military Staff Committee."" There was further talk of setting up
a naval patrol to enforce the embargo against Iraq and occupied
Kuwait pursuant to Article 42 of the Charter," 5 which empowers
the Council to take such measures."" Eventually, even the Arab
countries decided" 7 to send troops into Saudi Arabia. Only
Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organization backed Iraq."'
American President George Bush later ordered American
maritime forces in the Gulf region to halt all shipping headed to
00 Id. at para. 1. The Security Council: "Decides that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq
under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null and
void .. " Id.
10 Id. at para. 2. The Security Council: "Calls upon all States, international organi-
zations and specialized agencies not to recognize that annexation, and to refrain from
any action or dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexa-
tion .. " Id.
11 Id. at para. 3. The Security Council: "3. Further demands that Iraq rescind its
actions purporting to annex Kuwait. ... Id.
. Gordon, First American Deployment to Gulf is "Tip of Wedge" the Pentagon
Says, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1990, at Al, col. 6. For a detailed breakdown of forces, see
N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1990, at A15 and A16.
I12 Apple, U.S. Says Its Troops in the Gulf Could Reach 100,000 in Months, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 11, 1990, at Al, col. 4. For more details on the deployed American forces, see
N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1990, at A10, col. 1.
"' Kifner, supra note 103, at Al, col. 6.
Lewis, U.N. Council Declares Void Iraqi Annexation of Kuwait, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 10, 1990, at All, col. 1.
111 For the full text of Article 42, see supra note 61.
110 Lewis, supra note 114, at All.
117 Kifner, Arabs Vote to Send Troops to Help Saudis; Boycott of Iraqi Oil is Re-
ported Near, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1990, at Al, col. 6. Those who voted to send troops
were Bahrain, Djbouti, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Somalia, Syria and the United Arab Emirates. Iraq, Libya and the Palestine Liberation
Organization voted against the Arab resolution. Mauritania, Jordan and Sudan expressed
reservations. Algeria and Yemen abstained in the voting. Tunisia was absent. Id.
118 Id.
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or from Iraq in violation of the previous resolutions. 9 The
United States joined Moscow's earlier call to reactivate the mor-
ibund Military Staff Committee.1
20
During this time, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein proposed
withdrawals of all occupations and forces in the Middle East
and the replacement of western forces with Arab forces. 2' How-
ever, this proposal received no welcome response.
Over the next several months, the Security Council passed
several more resolutions with regard to the Gulf Crisis. 122 In gen-
,19 Gordon, Bush Orders Navy to Halt All Shipments of Iraq's Oil and Almost All
its Imports, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
12 Lewis, U.S. Seeks to Revive Panel that Enforces U.N. Decrees, N.Y. Times, Aug.
15, 1990, at A19, col. 1.
" Proposals by Iraqi President: Excerpts From His Address, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13,
1990, at A8, col. 5. Hussein stated:
I propose that all cases of occupation, and those cases that have been por-
trayed as occupation, in the region, be resolved simultaneouly [sic] and on the
same principles and basis that should be laid down by the Security Council, as
follows:
Preparation for an immediate and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from oc-
cupied Arab lands in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon; a Syrian withdrawal from
Lebanon; mutual withdrawals by Iraq and Iran and arrangement for the situation
in Kuwait.
All military withdrawals and all related political arrangements should take
into consideration Iraq's historical territorial rights and guarantee the Kuwaiti
people's right to decide on their future.
The basis of the program should be all United Nations and Security Council
resolutions, both to arrive at the earliest possible solution and to apply the same
action taken by the Security Council against Iraq on any party that does not com-
ply with these arrangements and answer to them.
In order to reveal the facts to one world public opinion, to judge them accord-
ing to objective conditions away from American wishes and pressure, we call for
the immediate withdrawal of American forces and all other forces that responded
to this plot from Saudi Arabia, to be replaced by an Arab force, whose duties,
nationality, size and area of deployment should be determined by the Security
Council aided by the Secretary General of the United Nations.
In deciding the nationality of these forces, they should not include any troops
from Egypt, which is being used by the United States as a cornerstone in its con-
spiracies against the Arabs. There should be an immediate freeze of all boycott
and siege decisions, and matters should go back to normal in economic, political
and scientific dealings between Iraq and the world, or these sanctions should be
imposed on any party refusing to comply and respond to the conditions stated
above.
Id.
12 Only cursory reference shall be made to certain resolutions not having a direct
bearing on the deployment of forces or the use of sanctions or armed force.
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eral, these concerned: (1) Iraq's taking third State nationals12 3
hostage, (2) the closing of diplomatic missions in Kuwait, and
(3) the provisions for foodstuffs and medical supplies.124 In sev-
eral of these resolutions, the Council further dealt with enforce-
ment of the sanctions previously mentioned.
On August 25, 1990, while noting that Iraq continued its re-
fusal to comply with previous resolutions, 12  the Security Coun-
cil called upon Member States to halt all maritime shipping
which would support Iraq's trade.126 The resolution asked Mem-
ber States to use political and diplomatic measures 12 7 and to
provide assistance to the maritime forces operating in the
Gulf.128 It also requested the States which had their maritime
forces deployed in the Gulf to use appropriate mechanisms of
the Military Staff Committee and to report to the Security
Council.12 9
123 This means nationals of states other than Iraq and Kuwait.
124 See S.C. Res. 664, 45 U.N. SCOR (2937th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/664 (1990),
S.C. Res. 665, 45 U.N. SCOR (2938th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990) [hereinafter
Resolution 665], S.C. Res. 666, 45 U.N. SCOR (2939th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/666
(1990), S.C. Res. 667, 45 U.N. SCOR (2940th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/667 (1990), S.C.
Res. 669, 45 U.N. SCOR (2942nd mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/669 (1990), S.C. Res. 670, 45
U.N. SCOR (2943rd mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/670 (1990) [hereinafter Resolution 6701, and
S.C. Res. 674, 45 U.N. SCOR (2951st mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/674 (1990) [hereinafter
Resolution 674].
12' Resolution 665, supra note 124. This provides: "Gravely alarmed that Iraq con-
tinues to refuse to comply with resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664
(1990) and in particular at the conduct of the Government of Iraq in using Iraqi flag
vessels to export oil .... " Id.
120 Id. at para. 1. This provides:
1. Calls upon those Member States co-operating with the Government of Ku-
wait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures com-
mensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority
of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order
to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implemen-
tation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in resolution 661
(1990).
Id.
12 Id. at para. 2. The Security Council: "Invites Member States accordingly to co-
operate as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of resolution 661
(1990) with maximum use of political and diplomatic measures, in accordance with para-
graph 1 above ...." Id.
8 Id. at para. 3. The Security Council: "Requests all States to provide in accor-
dance with the Charter such assistance as may be required by the States referred to in
paragraph 1 of this resolution .... " Id.
129 Id. at para. 4. Pursuant to this paragraph the Security Council:
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On September 25, 1990, the Council adopted a resolution3 "
extending enforcement of this embargo to include the use of all
means of transportation, including aircraft.1 31 It declared that all
States are to take measures to ensure that the embargo is not
circumvented by the use of aircraft. 32 It also asked States to
notify the Committee of any flights not destined to land in but
destined to pass over Iraq or Kuwait.13 3
On October 29, 1990, the Security Council adopted yet an-
4. Further requests the States concerned to co-ordinate their actions in pur-
suit of the above paragraphs of this resolution using as appropriate mechanisms of
the Military Staff Committee and after consultation with the Secretary-General to
submit reports to the Security Council and its committee established under reso-
lution 661 (1990) to facilitate the monitoring of the implementation of this resolu-
tion ....
Id.
1SO Resolution 670, supra note 124.
"' Id. at para. 2. The Security Council: "2. Confirms that resolution 661 (1990) ap-
plies to all means of transport, including aircraft . Id.
II Id. at paras. 3, 4 and 5.
3. Decides that all States, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obli-
gations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract en-
tered into or any licence or permit granted before the date of the present resolu-
tion, shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from their territory if the
aircraft would carry any cargo to or from Iraq or Kuwait other than food in hu-
manitarian circumstances, subject to authorization by the council or the Commit-
tee established by resolution 661 (1990) and in accordance with resolution 666
(1990), or supplies intended strictly for medical purposes or solely for UNIIMOG;
4. Decides further that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft des-
tined to land in Iraq or Kuwait, whatever its State of registration, to overfly its
territory unless:
(a) The aircraft lands at an airfield designated by that State outside Iraq or
Kuwait in order to permit its inspection to ensure that there is no cargo on board
in violation of resolution 661 (1990) or the present resolution, and for this purpose
the aircraft may be detained for as long as necessary; or
(b) The particular flight has been approved by the Committee established by
resolution 661 (1990); or
(c) The flight is certified by the United Nations as solely for the purposes of
UNIIMOG;
5. Decides that each State shall take all necessary measures to ensure that
any aircraft registered in its territory or operated by an operator who has his prin-
ciple place of business or permanent residence in its territory complies with the
provisions of resolution 661 (1990) and the present resolution . ...
Id.
I 13 Id. at para. 6. The Security Council: "6. Decides further that all States shall
notify in a timely fashion the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) of any
flight between its territory and Iraq or Kuwait to which the requirement to land in para-
graph 4 above does not apply, and the purpose for such a flight .... " Id.
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other resolution'"' condemning Iraq's actions with regard to
State's nationals and embassies in Kuwait. This time the Coun-
cil went further, reminding Iraq that it may be held liable for
any loss or damage caused by its actions.
Before this resolution was adopted, representatives from
both Iraq and Kuwait addressed the Security Council.'5 5 The
Iraqi representative warned of the greed of foreigners for oil and
water resources and urged the Council to seek a resolution in an
Arab framework, as Saddam Hussein had previously
proposed.""6
. Conversely, the Kuwaiti representative found it odd that
Iraq was now proposing a peaceful resolution. For twelve years,
Iraq had ignored Kuwait's efforts to reach a peaceful settlement
of their disputes. Then Iraq prepared for the August assault on
Kuwait."3 7 The Kuwaiti representative also noted Iraq's appar-
13' Resolution 674, supra note 124.
"' United Nations Department of Public Information, Security Council Demands
Iraq Stop Taking Third-Country Nationals as Hostages in Iraq and Kuwait; Cuba and
Yemen Abstain in Vote, SC/5224, October 29, 1990 at 1 [hereinafter Press Release]. The
reporter of the meeting described the Iraqi representative's comments as follows:
Before the Council acted, Amir Al-Anbari (Iraq), speaking for more than an
hour, said the Council's approach ran counter to international law and the Char-
ter. Warning of the greed of foreigners with respect to oil and water resources, he
called for the crisis to be solved in an Arab framework. He said that by ignoring
President Saddam Hussein's proposal to solve all the problems of the region in a
just and equitable manner, the Council had increased the risk of war and sent a
message to the "Zionist entity" and others that they could continue to act with
impunity.
Commenting on the resolution, the Iraqi representative said it implied that
the Secretary-General's good offices could only bear fruit if Iraq ceded its national
interests and capitulated. Why should there be concern about the freedom of
movement of third-country nationals, when all the people of Iraq were being held
hostage by foreign forces? he asked. He said the Council was not in a judicial
position to continue acting against Iraq even after the crisis was resolved [and
that the Council's acting in such a way] proved that certain States were intent on
looting the Iraqi patrimony.
Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 2. The reporter described the comments of the Kuwaiti representative as
follows:
The representative of Kuwait, Mohammad A. Abulhasan, said the Iraqi repre-
sentative had spoken at length about the peaceful settlement of disputes but had
ignored differences of approach between Iraq and Kuwait. Kuwait had attempted
to resolve its differences with Iraq over a period of 12 years, but Iraq had procras-
tinated in order to mislead the whole world and to prepare for the action it had
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ent ignorance of the Arab League's condemnation of the inva-
sion and its call for an Arab Summit to resolve the crisis.1
3 8
Before voting on the resolution, each member of the Secur-
ity Council addressed the Council to explain the reasons for
their votes and the reservations they had with the resolution.
The paragraphs of the resolution receiving the most criticism
were paragraphs 8 and 9. Paragraph 8 was aimed at Iraq's liabil-
ity under international law for the losses of Kuwaiti or third
State's nationals and their commercial enterprises as a result of
the invasion."3 9 Paragraph 9 invited States to collect information
for use in bringing claims for such losses against Iraq. ' °
In opposition to these provisions, Ricardo Alarcon De
Quesada of Cuba said that they purported to give the Security
Council the power to decide liability as though it were a judicial
entity."" Thomas R. Pickering of the United States said, in re-
ply, that the Council was merely demanding Iraq cease its mis-
treatment of these nationals. Further, he said that every nation
has a duty to protect its citizens and may bring actions for repa-
rations from those who harm them. 42
After passage of Resolution 674 and in response to the pre-
viously mentioned calls for the use of the Military Staff Com-
mittee, the United Nations issued a communique announcing
that "informal consultations of the Members of the Military
Staff Committee will be held, at a senior military level at the
Mission of France, the current coordinator for the Five Perma-
taken in August. The Iraqi regime behaved as though it were not aware that the
Arab League had condemned its aggression within hours of the invasion, and the
Arab Summit had called for its unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. "Kuwait
will be liberated[,"] he said, and it would continue to expose Iraqi actions against
the Kuwaiti people and property.
Id. at 2.
138 Id.
" Resolution 674, supra note 124, at para. 8. Here the Security Council: "8. Re-
minds Iraq that under international law it is liable for any loss, damage or injury arising
in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of
the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq .... " Id.
40 Id. at para. 9. In this paragraph, the Security Council: "9. Invites States to col-
lect relevant information regarding their claims, and those of their nationals and corpo-
rations, for restitution or financial compensation by Iraq with a view to such arrange-
ments as may be established in accordance with international law .. Id.
.41 Press Release, supra note 135.
142 Id.
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nent Members of the Security Council.' 4 3
On November 30, 1990, the Security Council passed one
more resolution,'44 this time authorizing the use of armed force.
First, the resolution noted the Council's previous resolutions,
adding that "despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq ref-
uses to comply with its obligation to implement Resolution 660
(1990) and subsequent resolutions, in flagrant contempt of the
Council."' 45 Next, it (1) demanded Iraq comply with these reso-
lutions,"' (2) authorized member states to use "all necessary
means" to implement the sanctions,"17 and (3) requested all
States (a) to assist those who are implementing the sanctions
and (b) to keep the Council informed as to the progress of these
actions."18
Sitting as President of the Council for the session, American
Secretary of State James A. Baker III addressed the Council,
echoing the words put forth in the opening session of the Gen-
eral Assembly when the United Nations was first formed." 9 He
referred to a quote from then-Ethiopian President Haile Selas-
sie, in his appeal to the League of Nations after Italy invaded
Ethiopia. The League's efforts in obtaining a peaceful solution
to that invasion subsequently failed.
The United Nations, Secretary Baker said, now faces the
"I This Communique was not officially released or recorded. Larry D. Johnson of
the Counsel of Legal Affairs at the United Nations provided a copy of this Communique
to the author.
' S.C. Res. 678, 45 U.N. SCOR (2963rd mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
146 Id.
"I Id. at para. 1. The Security Council: "1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with
Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and decides, while main-
taining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of good will, to do
so .. ." Id.
Id. at para. 2.
2. Authorizes member states cooperating with the Government of Kuwait,
unless Iraq on or before January 15, 1991, fully implements, as set forth in para-
graph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and
implement the Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant Reso-
lutions and to restore international peace and security in the area . . ..
Id.
148 Id. at paras. 3 and 4: "3. Requests all states to provide appropriate support for
the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of this resolution; and 4. Requests
the states concerned to keep the Council regularly informed on the progress of actions
undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this resolution ...." Id.
"' See Address of Chairman of First General Assembly, supra note 12.
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same fate as the League of Nations, if its efforts to resolve the
Gulf Crisis were to fail. Therefore, in order to achieve the peace-
ful world envisioned in the United Nations Charter, the world
body must convince Saddam Hussein, as well as others like him,
that such aggression will be stopped and the aggressors turned
back by force, if necessary. 150
President Hussein failed to comply with the Security Coun-
cil resolutions and the multinational forces subsequently carried
out a military assault upon Iraqi armed forces in occupied Ku-
wait and Iraq. Iraq finally surrendered and terms for a perma-
nent cease-fire were worked out by the Security Council.
"I Debate of Resolution 678, reprinted in Excerpts From U.S., Kuwaiti, Iraqi and
Chinese Remarks on the Resolution, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1990, at A10, col. 1. Secretary
Baker's remarks were recorded as follows:
I would like to begin today's discussion with a quotation that I think aptly
sets the context for our discussions today. The quotation is as follows:
"There is no precedent for a people being the victim of such injustice and of
being at present threatened by abandonment to an aggressor. Also, there has
never before been an example of any government proceeding with the systematic
extermination of a nation by barbarous means in violation of the most solemn
promises made to all the nations of the earth, that there should be no resort to a
war of conquest and that there should not be used against innocent human beings
terrible poison and harmful gases."
These words, I think, could well have come from the Emir of Kuwait, but
they do not. They were spoken instead in 1936, not in 1990; they come from Haile
Selassie, the leader of Ethiopia, a man who saw his country conquered and occu-
pied much like Kuwait has been brutalized since Aug. 2.
Sadly, colleagues, that appeal to the League of Nations fell ultimately upon
deaf ears. The League's efforts to redress aggression failed and international disor-
der and war ensued. History has now given us another chance. With the cold war
behind us, we now have the chance to build a world which was envisioned by the
founders of this organization, by the founders of the United Nations.
We have the chance to make this Security Council and this United Nations
true instruments for peace and for justice across the globe. We must not let the
United Nations go the way of the League of Nations. We must fulfill our common
vision of a peaceful and just post-cold-war world.
But if we are to do so, we must meet the threat to international peace created
by Saddam Hussein's aggression. And that is why the debate that we are about to
begin will, I think, rank as one of the most important in the history of the United
Nations. It will surely do much to determine the future of this body.
Our aim today must be to convince Saddam Hussein that the just and hu-
mane demands of this Council, and of the international community, cannot be
ignored. If Iraq does not reverse .its course peacefully, then other necessary mea-
sures, including the use of force, should be authorized. We must put the choice to
Saddam Hussein, in unmistakeable terms.
Id. The resolution was then debated and adopted, with China the only permanent mem-
ber abstaining. Id.
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On April 3, 1991, the Security Council adopted a resolu-
tion15 delineating the cease-fire terms President Hussein must
accept on behalf of Iraq. Among the terms were: (1) that Iraq
must forego its claim to Kuwait and accept the territorial
boundaries between the two countries as set forth in Iraq's for-
mal recognition of Kuwait in 1963,15 and (2) that Iraq is liable
under international law to pay reparations for losses to Kuwait
and other States and their nationals arising from the illegal
invasion.153
These terms were exactly those which the representatives
from Cuba and Iraq warned that the Council would make, in
their addresses to the Council before Resolution 674 was
adopted. 54 The non-aligned Members of the Security Council
who offered amendments to soften the resolution, wanted the
Council to tell Iraq and Kuwait to settle their territorial dispute
by negotiation, instead of ordering Iraq to accept the boundary
agreed to in the 1963 treaty. 55
The objections these representatives made appear to have
been legitimate. The Charter provides that the judicial power of
the United Nations resides in the International Court of Justice,
not the Security Council.156 Thus, in its resolution on the terms
1 See Excerpts From Draft U.N. Resolution on the Cease-Fire in the Gulf, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 3, 1991, at A9.
152 In paragraph 2 of the Cease-Fire Resolution, the Security Council: "2. Demands
that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary and the
allocation of islands set out in the 'Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the
Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations and Related Matters,'
signed at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 .... " Id. at col. 1.
153 In paragraph 16 of the Cease-Fire Resolution, the Security Council: "16. Reaf-
firms that Iraq . . . is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, includ-
ing environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign
governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and oc-
cupation of Kuwait .... " Id. at col. 3.
'51 See supra notes 135 and 141.
155 Lewis, U.N., Near Cease-Fire Deal, Sets Aside Rebels Plight, N.Y. Times, Apr.
3, 1991, at A9, col. 2.
156 Article 92 of the U.N. Charter and Article 36 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice determine where the judicial power of the United Nations rests. Article
92 provides: "The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of
the United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is
based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an
integral part of the present Charter." U.N. CHARTER art 92. Article 36 provides:
1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to
it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in
1991]
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for a cease-fire in the Gulf War, the Security Council acted with-
out authority under the United Nations Charter. These disputes
must be reconciled pursuant to the terms of the Charter, under
Article 33,157 by peaceful means to be chosen by both Iraq and
Kuwait, not the Security Council.
B. Summary
Iraq's invasion was condemned and military forces were
deployed against Iraq, not only by the United States, but by
many other nations, including Arab nations. In addition, the
permanent members of the Security Council cooperated to rally
the world against the aggressive military regime of Saddam Hus-
sein, using the step-by-step process required by the United Na-
tions Charter before authorizing the use of armed force. Despite
these positive events, there are some fundamental concerns
about the Gulf Crisis regarding the issue as to whether collective
security was truly attained.
By the time the resolution authorizing the use of force was
adopted, more than 240,000 American troops had been ordered
treaties and conventions in force.
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to
any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all
legal disputes concerning:
(a) the interpretation of a treaty;
(b) any question of international law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of
an international obligation;
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.
3. The declaration referred to above may be made unconditionally or on con-
dition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain time.
4. Such declaration shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute
and to the Registrar of the Court.
5. Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court
of International Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between
the parties to the present Statute, to be acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run
and in accordance with their terms.
6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the mat-
ter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTIcE art. 36.
... For the text of Article 33, paragraph 1, see supra note 24.
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol3/iss1/9
COLLECTIVE SECURITY
to the Gulf region. 158 As a result of this troop movement and by
not having these commitments agreed to ahead of time, the
United States put itself in a weak negotiating position with re-
gard to persuading other countries to commit forces. 15 9 It be-
came clear that the United States was taking on the tremendous
burden of enforcing these Security Council resolutions with rela-
tively little military, logistical or financial assistance from its al-
lies or other Members of the United Nations. 160 Therefore, at
the initial stages of the Gulf Crisis American military resources
and, more importantly, American lives were, for the most part,
at the forefront in enforcing the United Nations' resolutions.
The question begging to be asked is whether collective se-
curity is attainable, in light of this unequal burden sharing, be-
cause the United States should not have to bear nearly all of the
burden of enforcing Security Council resolutions. Furthermore,
it is necessary to look at the United Nations' own capacity to
implement its resolutions, because the United Nations should
not be dependent on one major power to be effective.
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ACTIONS TAKEN IN THE GULF
CRISIS WITH THOSE TAKEN IN THE KOREAN CONFLICT
Prior to these developments in the Gulf Crisis, the only
other time the Security Council was able to act in response to
one sovereign State's aggression against another was in the case
of the Korean Conflict. In response to North Korea's invasion of
South Korea, the Council authorized the United States to lead a
multinational armed force, to use armed force, and to use the
United Nations flag. In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait,
the Council called on States to lend the assistance of their
armed forces and authorized the actual use of armed force. How-
ever, the United Nations did not authorize the use of the United
Nations flag, nor did it grant a unified command of forces as it
18 Gordon, U.S. is Considering Addition Forces to Confront Iraq, N.Y. Times, Oct.
24, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
'59 Former American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told this to the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee on the day before the United Nations adopted its Resolution
that authorized the use of force. The author observed a television broadcast of this hear-
ing on CSPAN. The hearing has not been reported in writing at this time.
180 See The Balance of Power in the Air: Who Has What, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17,
1991, at A15.
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did in Korea.
Another difference between the Korean Conflict and the
Gulf Crisis is that while there was continued fighting between
opposing armed forces in the Korean Conflict, there was no
fighting between the Iraqi army and any opposing forces in the
Gulf region at the time the use of force resolution was adopted.
This may explain the Security Council's hesitation to authorize
the use of armed force in the Gulf Crisis and the absence of hesi-
tation in the Korean Conflict. Nevertheless, there are similarities
which permit comparative analysis to determine whether collec-
tive security was achieved in either case.
A. Security Council Resolutions in the Korean Conflict
The first Security Council Resolution in the Korean War
came on June 25, 1950, after armed forces from the North in-
vaded the South. First the Council invited the Republic of Ko-
rea to sit in on the deliberations161 during which the Council de-
termined that there had been a breach of peace.16 ' Then, it
"" Complaint of Aggression Upon the Republic of Korea, 5 U.N. SCOR (473rd mtg.)
at 3 (1950), reprinted in 2 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 83 (Djonovich ed. 1988). This
provides: "At its 473rd meeting, on 25 June 1950, the Council decided, under rule 39 of
the provisional rules of procedure, to invite the representative of the Republic of Korea
to take a place at the Council table during the consideration of the question." Id.
'6' S.C. Res. 82, 5 U.N. SCOR (473rd mtg.) at 4, U.N. doc. S/1501 (1950) [hereinaf-
ter Resolution 82]. This provides, in pertinent part:
The Security Council,
Recalling the finding of the General Assembly in its resolution 293 (IV) of 21
October 1949 that the Government of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully estab-
lished government having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea
where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe
and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that
this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free
will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Tem-
porary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea,
Mindful of the concern expressed by the General Assembly in its resolutions
195 (III) of 12 December 1948 and 293 (IV) of 21 October 1949 about the conse-
quences which might follow unless Member States refrained from acts derogatory
to the results sought to be achieved by the United Nations in bringing about the
complete independence and unity of Korea; and the concern expressed that the
situation described by the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report
menaces the safety and well-being of the Republic of Korea and of the people of
Korea and might lead to open military conflict there,
Noting with grave concern the armed attack on the Republic of Korea by
forces from North Korea,
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called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal
of armed forces. 6 ' It requested the United Nations Commission
on Korea to communicate this resolution, to observe the with-
drawal, and to report to the Council.16 4 It also called upon Mem-
ber States to assist the United Nations and to refrain from as-
sisting the North Korean authorities. 165
The second resolution of the Korean Conflict 6" came on
June 27, 1950. The Council noted the Commission's report of
continued hostilities and the Korean government's request for
assistance, and it asked Members to render such assistance.1 7
Approximately two weeks later, on July 7, 1950, the Secur-
ity Council passed a third resolution, 8 in which the Council au-
Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace ....
Id.
'6' This section of Resolution 82: "Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities;
Calls upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to
the 38th parallel .... " Id. at para. I.
"' This part of Resolution 82 states: "Requests the United Nations Commission on
Korea: (a) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with
the least possible delay; (b) To observe the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the
38th parallel; (c) To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolu-
tion .. " Id. at para. II.
165 In this part of the Resolution, the United Nations: "Calls upon all Member
States to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolu-
tion and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities." Id. at para.
III.
",6 S.C. Res. 83, 5 U.N. SCOR (474th mtg.) at 5, U.N. Doc. S/1511 (1950) [hereinaf-
ter Resolution 83].
117 Resolution 83 provides:
The Security Council,
Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by
forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,
Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities,
Having called upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw forthwith
their armed forces to the 38th parallel,
Having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea
that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn
their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and that urgent military measures are re-
quired to restore international peace and security,
Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations
for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security,
Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance
to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to
restore international peace and security in the area.
Id.
J6 S.C. Res. 84, 5 U.N. SCOR (476th mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. S/1588 (1950) [hereinaf-
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thorized the use of force, designated the United States as the
unified commander of the United Nations forces, and authorized
the use of the United Nations flag.169
The Security Council's resolutions and the deployment of
forces in the Korean Conflict fall outside the definitions of col-
lective security. 70 Pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter,' 7 1 they
cannot be considered as collective self-defense. 1 2 Rather, they
ter Resolution 84].
Resolution 84 provides:
The Security Council,
Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by
forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,
Having recommended that Members of the United Nations furnish such as-
sistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack
and to restore international peace and security in the area,
1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which Governments and peo-
ples of the United Nations have given to its resolutions 82 (1950) and 83 (1950) of
25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against
armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area;
2. Notes that Members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United
Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea;
3. Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other assis-
tance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and
other assistance available to a unified command under the United States of
America;
4. Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces;
5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Na-
tions flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently
with the flags of the various nations participating;
6. Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as
appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.
Id.
170 See Wolfers, Collective Security and the War in Korea, in FROM-COLLECTIVE
SECURITY TO PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY 225 (Larus ed. 1965). Arnold Wolfers said:
Collective security presupposes that the aggressor be named and condemned by
means of some recognized procedure; resort to violence in defense of the law
against such an aggressor must be authorized by an organization which can claim
to speak for the community. Yet no provisions, resolutions, commands, or recom-
mendations of a world organization of sovereign nations can suffice to make collec-
tive security a reality. It can become real only by the fact of military power being
employed for police purposes; the decision rests with the members who possess
such military power and can use it for collective security if they will. In regard to
the United Nations, the question is merely whether it did its part in inducing
members of the organization to take police action on its behalf and under its
auspices.
Id. at 228 (emphases added).
,'7 For the full text of Article 51, see supra note 92.
172 Collective defense is defined as:
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have been called a simple police action under the auspices of the
United Nations. 173
B. Analyses of the Attainment of Collective Security
The analysis of whether collective security was actually
achieved centers on the question of whether the United States
had any vital interests at stake.' 74 This determination is crucial
because only when the United States has demonstrated that it
will commit troops despite its own interests would other nations
feel secure in depending on the United States for collective se-
curity. When the United States, as the leading protagonist
against aggressors, is committed to the principle of collective se-
curity, nations will be encouraged to observe international law
and to call upon the United Nations to enforce international
law. It has been argued that if there were no vital American in-
terests at stake in the region of conflict, the conclusion that the
United States was committed to the principle of collective secur-
ity would be clear.' 75 Conversely, in the presence of such inter-
ests, the commitment of the United States would be unclear.' 76
In the Korean Conflict, had the South invaded the North
and the United States aided the North, it would have been clear
that the United States was acting pursuant to the principle of
collective security. To side with North Korea "would have
meant siding with this country's chief national enemy, the So-
viet bloc. . . . ,177 Conversely, the North invaded the South and
the United States aided the South. There were at least three
[a]n international term introduced by the Pact of the League of Nations of 1919
for an obligation assumed by the members of the League of Nations to co-operate
and render support in the case when "one of the members resorts to war counter
to the duties provided for in arts. 12, 13, or 15 . . . .This system failed in con-
frontation with the policy of aggression exercised by Japan ... Italy and the
Third Reich. In effect, after World War II the United Nations Charter introduced
a system of collective security, providing for immediate acts of repression within
the frames of the United Nations in emergency cases.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 158 (Taylor &
Francis ed. 1985).
' See Franck & Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order
Changeth", 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 70 (1990) [hereinafter Franck & Patel].
"' See Wolfers, supra note 170.
175 Id.
171 Id. at 230.
177 Id.
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discernible American interests which, "thinking along the lines
of traditional power politics, governments would normally con-
sider serious enough to justify military action or even make it
imperative.' 1 78 First, "any further expansion in any direction on
the part of the Soviet bloc constituted a threat to American se-
curity.' 7 9 Second, "the United States was vitally interested in
proving to its European Allies that they could rely on American
military assistance in case of a Soviet attack."' 80 Third, "[t]he
United States was engaged in a vast and strenuous effort to
unite the entire free world in a common effort of defense against
the Soviet and Communist menace."' 8 '
Since the United States had vital interests at stake in the
Korean Conflict, it was unclear whether the United States was
truly committed to collective security. The United States has
heretofore not been put in a position where it would have an
opportunity to aid a victim State in a situation where the United
States would have to confront one of its allies or otherwise act
against its own interest.
The same was true in the Gulf Crisis. As in the Korean Con-
flict, the United States had vital interests at stake in the Gulf.
At first these interests may have appeared vague. 82 However, it
is clear that the United States had a vital interest in the oil in
the Gulf region.1 83 John C. West, former Ambassador to Saudi
Arabia, 1977-81, said:
We do have a tremendous economic stake in the Mideast. We
cannot afford to have Saddam Hussein or anyone else who is un-
friendly to the United States control nearly half of the world's oil
supplies. The fact is that we are far more dependent on imported
Mideast oil than we want to admit.8 4
178 Id. at 231.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
,' Friedman, U.S. Gulf Policy: Vague 'Vital Interests', N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1990,
at Al, col. 3.
183 See generally U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CARTEL 129-62 (1976).
184 Many Prominent Members Say Vital Interests Are at Stake in the Gulf ...
Resistance to Blatant Aggression, Defense of Allies and, Above All, Oil, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 13, 1990, at A10, col. 3 [hereinafter Vital Interests].
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Since the United States had vital interests at stake, there was no
opportunity to prove that it would act against its own interest to
defend a victim State. Based on this argument alone, the
strength of the United States' committment to the principle of
collective security is still unclear.
In a world where nations are so greatly interdependent, 85
there may never be a situation suitable for response by the Se-
curity Council, where the United States does not have a vital
interest at stake. Thus, other nations may not be able to deter-
mine whether forces are committed for collective security or
merely for national interests. If so, these nations may not feel
secure in their sovereignty, political independence and territorial
integrity, because they may not be able to tell if they would be
defended from an invasion.
American President George Bush 'a6  and others1 87  have
stated that the deployment of American forces in the Gulf re-
gion was for the protection of small, nearly defenseless countries
like Kuwait from their more powerful neighbors such as Iraq.
Reisman, International Law After the Cold War, 84 Am. J. INT'L L. 859 (1990).
ISO See Excerpts From President's News Conference on Crisis in Gulf, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 1, 1990, at A6, col. 1. President Bush, on the day after the Security Council author-
ized the use of armed force against Iraq in case it did not leave Kuwait by January 15,
1991, said:
We're in the gulf because the world must not and cannot reward aggression.
And we're there because our vital interests are at stake. And we're in the gulf
because of the brutality of Saddam Hussein.
We're dealing with a dangerous dictator all too willing to use force, who has
weapons of mass destruction and is seeking new ones and who desires to control
one of the world's key resources-all at a time in history when the rules of the
post-cold-war world are being written.
Id.
87 Henry Kissinger, former American Secretary of State, 1973-77, and national se-
curity adviser to President Richard M. Nixon, 1969-75, said:
The fundamental problem, it seems to me, is that this is the most blatant case
of 1930's-style aggression in the entire postwar period. In the middle of peace,
without any particular provocation except the desire for more territory, Iraq has
annexed Kuwait. If that is permitted to stand it will lead to a whole series of
conflicts and revolutions in the region.
If Saddam Hussein succeeds, in particular on the basis of the arguments he
has used-that Iraq has an implicit right to supplant Arab states by military ac-
tion-all the principalities in the gulf will be put at risk because virtually every
country in the area, including Jordan, fits Hussein's criteria for justifying the
overthrow of Kuwait, with the possible exception of Egypt.
Vital Interests, supra note 184, at A10, col. 1.
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Despite this intent, it may not ever be possible to prevent an
aggressor from asserting, as Hussein did, that the United States
is fighting for its own national interest. Since nations are now so
greatly interdependent, the United States will almost always
have an interest.
Furthermore, the United States, despite having become
"the 911 for the world,"18 may find that committing forces
would not be in its national interest.'89 In that case, where would
the Security Council be in trying to enforce its sanctions against
Iraq?190
IV. A PERMANENT UNITED NATIONS FORCE
The United Nations may overcome the dilemma posed in
determining whether forces will be deployed for the purpose of
collective security, by forming a permanent United Nations
force. 91 Such a force was contemplated during the formation of
the United Nations to compensate for the failure of the League
of Nations to avert war. Unfortunately, it appears that such a
force may never be put together for political reasons, in spite of
the cooperation of the permanent Members of the Security
Council in the aftermath of the cold war. If this is true, the
United Nations, like its predecessor, remains greatly limited in
fulfilling its role as an instrument to avert war.
'88 Quote from Representative Patricia Schroeder, Democrat of Colorado and a
member of the House Armed Services Committee. Id. at col. 5.
'89 On the day after the use of force resolution was adopted, the Congress warned
President Bush it may not grant a request for authorization of the use of armed force in
the Gulf. Rasky, House Leaders Tell President Not to Call Special Iraq Session, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 30, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
18o Reisman, supra note 185, at 862. Reisman stated:
For the short term, at least, the Security Council may simply not be strong
enough to perform the role assigned to it. In the meanwhile, the question will be
whether the United States, the erstwhile bulwark of international security, will
lose its vision, its sense of mission and its credibility. Should that happen, there
may be no international security system.
Id.
191 Such a force is different from a peacekeeping force. Whereas a peacekeeping
force is formed by a resolution of the Security Council or the General Assembly passed
pursuant to Chapter VI of the Charter, dealing with peaceful settlement of disputes, to
maintain peace between disputing States, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION,
THE BLUE HELMETS 7, 319 (1985), a multinational armed force would be formed pursuant
to Article 43, found in Chapter VII of the Charter, dealing with the use of armed force,
to end warfare..
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A permanent multinational force under the control of the
United Nations may even enhance the deterrent force of inter-
national law. Aggressive nations would know that even if the
United States is not willing to send forces to a region to repel an
aggressor, the United Nations would have forces at its disposal
to do so. With this in mind, weaker nations would be more se-
cure in their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political inde-
pendence. When weaker nations see that international law will
be enforced, they may be more willing to abide by it.
The idea of maintaining a multinational armed force cer-
tainly is not a new one. "As early as the year 1000, French
princes of the Church declared their willingness to make 'war
against war' by the intervention of collective military forces
under religious leadership."'192 When the United Nations was
first formed, the permanent members of the Security Council
were unable to agree, not on whether to have such a force, but
on the size and makeup of the force and how each nation was to
contribute to it.193 Moreover, it was Article 43,9 providing for
Members to designate forces to be made available for use by the
Security Council, that distinguished the Charter of the United
Nations from the Covenant of the failed League of Nations. 95
192 Rosner, The International Military Force Idea: A Look at Modern History, in
FROM COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY 445 (Larus ed. 1965) [hereinafter
COLLECTIVE SECURITY].
." Goodrich & Simons, The Rise and Fall of the Military Staff Committee, in COL-
LECTIVE SECURITY, supra note 192, at 219.
194 For the full text of Article 43, see supra note 62.
199 Franck & Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order Changeth",
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 65 (1990). The authors explained as follows:
The delegates to the San Francisco Conference recognized that the enforce-
ment provisions of chapter VI of the Charter provided "the teeth of the United
Nations." [citing SECRETARY OF STATE 79TH CONG., 1ST. SESS. REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT ON THE RESULTS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE 87 (Comm. Print 1945)].
The Committee considering its military enforcement measures adopted Article 42
unanimously. In so doing, delegates intended to give the Security Council "the
power, when diplomatic, economic, or other measures are considered by the Coun-
cil to be inadequate, to undertake such aerial, naval, or other operations as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." [citing Doc.
881, 111/3/46, 12 UNCIO Docs. 765-66 (1945).] This article was thought to remedy
the principal defect of the League Covenant [citing id. at 769.] and the Commit-
tee's rapporteur observed that "this unanimous vote ...renders sacred the obli-
gation of all states to participate in the operations." [citing id. at 766.] Thus,
"[mlilitary assistance, in case of aggression, ceases to be a recommendation made
to member states; it becomes for us an obligation which none can shirk." [citing
1991]
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Further, the United States Senate, in its debate to ratify the
Charter, expressed the belief that they were consenting to the
creation of "a new system in which an international institu-
tion-rather than individual states-would exercise principal re-
sponsibility, through global police power, for maintaining inter-
national peace and security." 19 Therefore, the idea that there
should be a multinational armed force under the United Na-
tions' control was arguably the cornerstone of the new interna-
tional security system envisioned by not only the original Mem-
bers of the United Nations in general, but the United States in
particular. Because such a force has not been formed, the United
Nations still has not implemented a system that serves to pro-
mote international peace and security better than did the
League of Nations.
After the Korean Conflict, numerous proposals were ad-
vanced to strengthen the United Nations and to assure that col-
lective security would be attained.197 Among these proposals was
one for a multinational armed force. 198 The Commission to
Study the Organization of Peace was concerned that the regional
arrangements formed pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter may
"stimulate the creation of a rival arrangement . . . [as] political
competition . . . [may tend] to draw states into a bi-polarized
world of great instability." '99 The Commission was also con-
cerned that these regional arrangements would render the
United Nations impotent.2 00  The Commission therefore
suggested:
four general methods of creating an international police force: (1)
a system based on co-ordinating national contingents; (2) an inte-
grated international force possible only in a centralized world
state; (3) a quota international force based on national states lim-
iting the size of their military forces in such a way as to leave the
controlling force in the hands of the international organization;
id., at 769.]
Id.
' Id. at 66.
See generally F. WILCOX & C. MARCY, PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN THE UNITED
NATIONS (1980).
". Id. at 164-80.
Id. at 149.
o Id. at 151.
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and (4) a specialized international force based on giving certain
types of effective armament to the international organization.2 '
Despite these recommendations, such a force was never
formed. Although the Korean Conflict was over, the cold war be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union had just begun. It
continued until 1990, just before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Until
the Gulf Crisis arose, the two superpowers were not only unable
to agree upon the size and makeup of a United Nations armed
force, but were also on opposing sides of a threatened nuclear
weapons confrontation.2"'
Now that the cold war is over, there is hope that the super-
powers can cooperate so that the Security Council can form a
multinational force designed to be deployed under the auspices
of the Security Council. In fact, both superpowers expressed
their desire to reactivate the Military Staff Committee20 3 and
the Council's resolutions asked Members to make their forces
available to the Committee. 0' Such a force should be given a
chance to further the observance and enforcement of interna-
tional law and to enhance the likelihood that the United Nations
will be successful at maintaining international peace and
security.
Unfortunately, it is very unlikely that such a force will be
formed. Three of the five permanent members of the Security
Council may not want the other two to have any control over the
use of armed forces deployed to enforce Security Council Reso-
lutions. Those who are not permanent members of the Security
2"I Id. at 165, citing Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Fourth Report,
396 INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 50-61 (1944).
202 Id. at 139. This states:
The fact is that the conflict-the so-called cold war-between the major pow-
ers is the situation most likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace. This situation cannot be manipulated out of existence by changes in the
provisions of the Charter for peaceful settlement. Indeed, excessive concentration
on and discussion of ways to improve provisions and techniques for peaceful set-
tlement might create the dangerous illusion that peace can be maintained if only
the proper procedures can be worked out. The result might be that false hopes
would be raised only to be dashed when states showed they had no intention of
following the procedures available.
Id.
23 See supra notes 114 and 120 and accompanying text.
11 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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Council may not want such a force, because they will not be able
to exercise control over it. Furthermore, the United States may
not be willing to give up its prowess as the sole military super-
power left after the cold war.
In addition, such questions would arise as to (1) who would
have control of these forces, (2) how each nation would make
their forces available to the United Nations, (3) to whom would
the troops owe their allegiance, (4) how to fund the training and
operations of these forces, (5) how to convince those nations
with strong military forces to give up their superiority and con-
tribute their technology, strategies and tactics, and (6) how to
convince all nations to consent to a system in which their sover-
eignty may slowly give way to a centralized world state.
In light of these concerns, it appears that a multinational
force under the control of the United Nations may not be
formed. If this is true, the United Nations' capacity to avert war
may prove to be just as impotent as that of the League of Na-
tions, and there is little reason to hope for international peace
and security.
CONCLUSION
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was the world's most blatant vio-
lation of international law since the end of the cold war. The
international response, led by the United States, proved that the
United Nations is ready to respond to aggression. The United
Nations is now prepared to follow the step-by-step process pro-
posed in its Charter to resolve disputes peacefully before resort-
ing to the use of armed force. Nevertheless, the world body still
has a fundamental weakness: it depends upon the strongest of
its Members to enforce the resolutions it passes in response to
illegal aggressions.
The Gulf Crisis also proved that the United States is ready
to commit troops to a region, such as the Persian Gulf, to pro-
tect its national interests. It is possible that the United States is
genuinely interested in protecting the sovereignty, territorial in-
tegrity and political independence of any country that is invaded
by another in violation of international law, even if doing so
would be against the United States' national interest. However,
it is unfair to expect other nations to depend upon the United
States to deploy troops to a region where the aggressor is a
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United States ally or where the United States has no vital inter-
ests at stake. One can not be sure that the United States' demo-
cratic process will prevent the deployment of American forces in
areas of conflict. As long as this is the case, the United Nations
can never be sure that its resolutions will be enforced. The
means of maintaining international peace and security and thus
promoting the observance and enforcement of international law,
envisioned in the formation of the United Nations, will have
been for naught.
One way in which all nations of this world can depend on
forces to be provided to protect them from aggression is to have
a multinational armed force under the United Nations' control.
Since the cold war is over, the permanent Members of the Se-
curity Council may cooperate to form such a force that can be
called into action at any time. Despite this cooperation, such a
proposal is politically unpopular and thus has very little chance
of being implemented. The United Nations' greatest task there-
fore is to overcome these political problems so that such a force
may be formed.
STEPHEN M. DE LUCA*
* This comment is dedicated to the author's brother, Mark E. De Luca, Captain,
USAF, who served as a pilot in the Gulf War.
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